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Resisting Termination: Some Comparative Observations 
 
 
Solène Rowan* 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Termination for breach of contract releases the parties from their contractual obligations to 
perform.
1
 It is a powerful and definitive device that discharges all unperformed primary 
obligations under the contract yet to accrue and ends the contractual relationship, often 
instantaneously.
2
 Significant commercial and financial consequences for the parties may 
ensue. This can be acute for the defaulting promisor. Not only is he deprived of the benefit of 
the contract; in many cases, he must also compensate the injured promisee in damages for 
losses caused by breach, possibly including the loss of the bargain. 
 With the aim of avoiding at least some of these consequences, the defaulting promisor 
could well wish to resist the promisee exercising his right to terminate. This chapter considers 
certain 'defences' that the promisor might invoke in order to do so.
3
 'Defences' here are 
defined by reference to their effect.
4
 That is to say, they are the grounds the promisor may 
rely upon, once the right to terminate has arisen, to resist termination or avoid or reduce its 
consequences. The chapter does not however seek to address how the remedy arises or the 
ways that the promisor can deny that the remedy has arisen, such as that one of its essential 
elements is missing (except briefly to give context to and incidentally in the discussion of the 
defences to termination that are covered). These topics are dealt with thoroughly elsewhere.
5
  
Since termination is a self-help device, a clarifying word is needed on how ‘defences’ 
might be invoked in this context. When faced with a repudiatory breach, the injured promisee 
has a choice: to terminate or affirm the contract. If he elects to terminate, all he must do is 
communicate to the defaulting promisor that he is treating the contract as being at an end.
6
 He 
does not need to apply to the court for an order terminating the contract.
7
 
This is not to say that the court has no role in this context. Recourse to the court may 
be necessary for a determination as to whether the contract was terminated effectively and, 
often more contentiously and importantly, by whom.
8
 The court might also be required to 
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1
 Only termination for breach of contract will be considered in this paper. Termination following frustration and 
force majeure is outside of its scope. 
2
 Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827 (HL).  
3
 For some possible grounds for resisting termination not considered in this paper, see M Bridge, ‘Freedom to 
Exercise Contractual Rights of Termination’ in L Gullifer and S Vogenauer (eds), English and European 
Perspectives on Contract and Commercial Law: Essays in Honour of Hugh Beale (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
2014). 
4
 See the different meanings that 'defences' can have: A Dyson, J Goudkamp, F Wilmot-Smith, 'Central Issues in 
the Law of Tort Defences' in A Dyson, J Goudkamp, F Wilmot-Smith (eds), Defences in Tort (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2015) 
5
 See, for instance, H Beale (ed), Chitty on Contracts, 32
nd
 edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2015) Chap 24. 
6
 Vitol SA v Norelf Ltd (the ‘Santa Clara’) [1996] AC 800 (HL) (Lord Steyn). 
7
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8
 In practice, it is relatively common for one party to purport to exercise a right to terminate for repudiatory 
breach and the other party to allege that doing so itself amounts to a repudiation and purport to accept the 
repudiation, in which case, both parties come before the court claiming to have terminated and an entitlement to 
damages, usually for loss of the bargain. 
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decide the consequences of termination and, in particular, resolve competing claims to 
compensatory damages. In any of these contexts, the defaulting promisor might wish to 
challenge the purported termination or the consequences that are alleged by the injured 
promisee to flow from it. If he is still willing to perform, he might even seek to argue and 
claim (or as the case may be counterclaim) a declaration that the contract remains or should 
be treated as remaining on foot.  
There is not necessarily inconsistency between the promisor having committed a 
breach that gives rise to a right to terminate and nonetheless being willing to perform.
9
 He 
may wish to do so for any number of reasons. Usually only by performing will he be entitled 
to receive the reciprocal consideration promised under the contract. He might also want to 
protect his reputation or be able to honour commitments made to third parties in connection 
with the contract. It may be that he has incurred expenses in advance of performance that 
would otherwise be wasted.
10
 Members of his workforce who would have had a role in 
performing the contract may end up being idle and unproductive to his and their own 
detriment. It should therefore be relatively uncontroversial that the promisor may wish to 
insist on performance even when in breach. 
The subject of this chapter is explored through comparative analysis of French law, a 
particularly instructive comparator because it is notoriously protective of the contractual bond 
created by the parties. In France, the promisor can resist termination in a host of ways. If he 
has performed defectively, he can offer to cure the breach. If he has not performed on time, 
he can request a time extension even when the breach is sufficiently serious to justify putting 
an end to the contract. Good faith also plays a role in restricting termination.  
It will be shown that the grounds for resisting termination in France go beyond those 
in English law. This is notwithstanding that, in England, a promisee wishing to terminate 
often faces a high hurdle to establish that he is entitled to do so. The right to terminate arises 
only in limited circumstances and the promisor cannot easily be ousted from the contract 
following a breach. Conversely, however, once the right to terminate has arisen, the grounds 
for resisting termination are relatively narrow; there is usually little that the promisor can do 
to resist. 
The divergences between England and France will be attributed to different policy 
choices that have been made in each jurisdiction. In France, the contract is paramount; it 
should be saved and performed where possible and termination is a remedy of last resort. 
There is no similar willingness to uphold a failed contract in England; the injured promisee 
can escape from the contract to reallocate his resources and obtain substitute performance 
elsewhere without any compunction. The promisor's predicament arouses less sympathy and 
he has correspondingly fewer defences to resist termination.   
The purpose of the chapter is to describe and comment on the defences that are 
available in England and France, and explain the differences between them. It might provoke 
but, due to spatial constraints, does not seek to engage in debate as to whether English law 
should be more protective of the defaulting promisor and allow him to resist termination 
more widely in circumstances where a right to terminate has arisen. The focus is not so much 
on English law as comparative analysis of the two systems.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 Except obviously in the case of a renunciation. 
10
 See the other reasons given in E Peel, Treitel on the Law of Contract, 14
th
 ed (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
2015) [18-004]. 
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II. Resisting Termination in English Law 
  
The practical effect of the high threshold facing the injured promisee wishing to terminate is 
that the interests of the defaulting promisor are largely protected at this stage rather than 
when the right has arisen. Brief mention must therefore first be made of how the right to 
terminate arises.  
 
A The Circumstances Giving Rise to a Right of Termination in English Law 
 
At common law, a contract can be terminated for breach only in narrow circumstances. The 
threshold for the injured promisee to be entitled to put an end to the contract is high. Only a 
serious breach will suffice. Such a breach would be made out where the promisor manifests a 
clear and absolute intention
11
 not to perform
12
 or disables himself from performing.
13
 A right 
to terminate also arises where the term breached is so important
14
 as to be a 'condition' of the 
contract, or an 'innominate term'
15
 and the consequences of the actual breach deprive the 
injured promisee of substantially the whole benefit of the contract.
16
  
The narrowness of the circumstances in which the right to terminate arises is 
illustrated by the fact that, in commercial contracts, the parties often incorporate an express 
term that confers a broader right to terminate.
17
 They can agree, for instance, that the right 
should arise upon a breach of a term, even where it is not of essential importance or the 
breach has no serious consequences for the injured promisee. In practice, many commercial 
contracts are very prescriptive as to the circumstances in which the right to terminate will 
arise.  
The high common law threshold shields the defaulting promisor from being deprived 
of the benefit of the contract too readily. It is satisfied only by the most severe breaches. 
When in breach, the promisor can still seek to argue that the right to terminate has not arisen 
because the term breached is not a condition but a warranty or an innominate term and the 
consequences of the breach are insufficiently serious. The flexibility of innominate terms 
reduces the likelihood of a term being classified as a condition such that the injured promisee 
has an inescapable right to terminate for any breach.
18
 This achieves proportionality: the more 
serious the breach, the more serious are the consequences.  
 
B 'Defences' to Termination in English Law 
 
In English law, where a common law right to terminate for breach has arisen, it is relatively 
unrestricted. Few defences are available to the promisor, who has little prospect of preventing 
the injured promisee from exercising the right, should he wish to do so. It is generally not 
                                                          
11
 Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp v Marine Transportation Co Ltd (The Hermosa) [1982] 1 Lloyd's Rep 570. 
12
 For a more detailed account of the law on renunciation, see Chitty on Contracts (n 5) [24-018] ff.  
13
 For a more detailed account of the law on impossibility, see Chitty on Contracts (n 5) [24-029] ff. 
14
 Peel (n 10) [18-023] ff. 
15
 Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Vanden Avenne-Izegem PVBA [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep 109 (HL) 113 (Lord 
Wilberforce); Hongkong Fir Shipping Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd (The 'Hongkong Fir') [1962] 2 QB 26 
(CA). 
16
 Hongkong Fir Shipping Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd (The 'Hongkong Fir') [1962] 2 QB 26 (CA) 70 
(Lord Diplock). 
17
 S Whittaker, ‘Termination Clauses’ in A Burrows and E Peel (eds), Contract Terms (Oxford, OUP, 2007) 
253, 256. 
18
 Peel (n 10) [18-050]. For a similar conclusion, see G Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract: A 
Comparative Account (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988) [259].  
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possible to require a second chance to perform or even a period of grace where time is of the 
essence. There is no general right to cure or requirement that the promisee should exercise his 
election between affirming and terminating in good faith.  
Only in specific circumstances can the promisor resist termination. He is confined to 
relying on the equitable jurisdiction of the court to grant relief against forfeiture or any 
indirect fetter on termination that results from the doctrine of loss mitigation, which may 
cause the promisee to accept a new tender from the promisor.  
 
(i) No Second Chances 
 
(a) No General Entitlement to a Grace Period 
 
The court does not have a general power to grant a period of grace to a defaulting promisor in 
repudiatory breach.
19
 Where time is of the essence and the promisor does not perform by the 
due date, the injured promisee's right to terminate arises immediately.
20
 The promisor cannot 
apply to the court for or require from the promisee an extension in time.
21
  
 One justification for the strict enforcement of time stipulations is the desire for 
commercial certainty. This was made clear in Union Eagle Ltd v Golden Achievement Ltd.
22 
A contract for the sale of a flat provided that completion should take place before a certain 
time and that time was of the essence. The purchaser paid the purchase price 10 minutes late. 
Citing the stipulation making time of the essence, the seller refused to accept payment and 
terminated the contract. It was held by the Privy Council to be entitled to do so. Lord 
Hoffmann justified the decision on the ground of commercial certainty. He said ‘in many 
forms of transaction, it is of great importance that if something happens for which the 
contract has made express provision, the parties should know with certainty that the terms of 
the contract will be enforced’.23 
In some circumstances the promisee's right to terminate can even arise before the due 
date for performance. If the promisor clearly renounces the contract or disables himself from 
performing, this is an anticipatory breach and the promisee can exercise his right to terminate 
straight away. It makes no difference that the time for performance is in the future and he 
need not wait until then to terminate.
24
 Once he has exercised his right to terminate, the 
contract is definitively discharged.  
 
(b) No General ‘Right to Cure’ the Breach  
 
In the same vein, where the performance rendered by the promisee does not comply with the 
contract and the breach is repudiatory, the promisor cannot require the promisee to grant him 
an opportunity to cure the breach before exercising the right to terminate.
25
 The promisor has 
                                                          
19
 S Whittaker, 'A Period of Grace for Contractual Performance?' in M Andenas and others (eds), Liber 
Amicorum Guido Alpa, Private Law Beyond the National Systems (London, BIICL, 2007) 1083. For examples 
of statutory exceptions, see the Law Property Act 1925, s146; the Consumer Credit Act 1974, ss76, 87 and 98. 
20
 Chitty (n 5) [21-015]. 
21
 Whittaker (n 19) 1100. 
22
 [1997] AC 514 (PC). 
23
 ibid at 518. 
24
 Hochster v De la Tour (1853) 2 E & B 678, 118 ER 922 (QB). 
25
 Buckland v Bournemouth University Higher Education Corp [2010] EWCA Civ 121 (CA), esp [40]; Lamarra 
v Capital Bank Plc [2006] 2007 SC 95 at [61] but see Ampurius Nu Homes Holdings Ltd v Telford Homes 
(Creekside) Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 577 at [63]. Peel (n 10) at [18-066] explains the latter decision in the 
following terms: 'the court was … primarily concerned with whether there had been a repudiatory breach based 
on the forward looking element of the uncertainty of future performance and here the fact that the breach had 
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no entitlement to a ‘second chance’ to perform. Instead, the promisee can terminate the 
contract and reject any further tenders that the promisor might make.
26
 As is explained in 
Chitty, 'English law does not permit a contracting party unilaterally to cure a repudiatory 
breach once it has been committed … the choice whether to affirm or not is the choice of the 
injured party. It cannot be taken from him by the party in breach making an offer of 
amends'.
27
 
 
(ii) The Irrelevance of Good Faith and Fairness in Terminating the Contract 
 
The defaulting promisor is also unable to challenge the decision of the injured promisee to 
exercise a common law right to terminate as not having been made in good faith. The right is 
not subject to any general requirement of good faith or fairness.
28
 The promisee's motives in 
exercising the right are irrelevant and he can put an end to the contract without giving 
reasons.
29
 He can therefore terminate to escape what has turned out to be an unprofitable 
bargain, for instance due to market fluctuations.
30
 This has been justified by a desire for 
commercial certainty and speedy resolution of disputes.
31
 Both are facilitated by the courts 
not investigating the promisee's motives for terminating. It is also consistent with the absence 
in English law of a general duty to act in good faith or concept of abuse of rights.
32
 
 Where the promisee has a contractual right to terminate, it is similarly unfettered. 
Outside the sphere of consumer contracts, for which there is specific legislation,
33
 termination 
clauses do not have to pass a threshold test of fairness or reasonableness in order to be valid. 
As long as they are clearly drafted, there is little inclination on the part of the courts to 
impede their operation.
34
 The most that might be expected is that, when ambiguously worded, 
they will be construed narrowly.
35
 There is no requirement that they are exercised in good 
faith.
36
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
been remedied, or the prospect of a cure, was a relevant consideration'. Note that consumer-buyers can under 
ss19(3), 19(4) and 23 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 require defaulting sellers to repair or replace non-
conforming goods. However, sellers have no right to demand an opportunity to repair or replace: see Chitty (n 
5) [38-414]. There is also nothing to prevent the parties from stipulating that the promisee is permitted to 
terminate only after the promisor has had an opportunity to remedy the breach within a defined period of time: 
see p [cross refer]. 
26
 Peel (n 10) [17-004]. 
27
 Chitty (n 5) at [24-002]. 
28
 On this topic, see R Hooley, 'Controlling Contractual Discretion' [2013] CLJ 65. 
29
 James Spencer Ltd v Tame Valley Padding Co Ltd (CA, 8 April 1998); SNCB Holding v UBS AG [2012] 
EWHC 2044 (Comm) at [73] (Cooke J); on this point, see R Brownsword, ‘Retrieving  Reasons, Retrieving 
Rationality? A New Look at the Right to Withdraw for Breach of Contract’ (1992) 5 JCL 83. But see Heisler v 
Anglo-Dal Ltd [1954] 1 WLR 1273. 
30
 The flexibility of the innominate terms has to a certain extent restricted termination where ulterior motives are 
in play: see Peel (n 10) [18-036] and [18-050]-[18-053]. See also the restriction in s15A of the Sale of Goods 
Act 1979 on the buyer's right to terminate for breach of a condition where the breach is so slight that it would be 
unreasonable for him to reject the goods, which is narrow in scope and has been described by Peel as 'an 
unfortunate provision': Peel (n 10) [18-057]. Benjamin describes it as a section 'of severely limited effect' in 
practice with no reported decisions on it since its enactement in 1994: M Bridge (ed), Benjamin’s Sale of Goods 
(London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2015) at [12-026]. 
31
 Hooley (n 28) 84. 
32
 ibid. See Chitty (n 5) [1-039]-[1-056] and Whittaker (n 17). 
33
 See the Consumer Rights Act 2015. For a general discussion of the Act, see Chitty on Contracts (n 5) ch 15.  
34
 J Cartwright, Contract Law: An Introduction to the English Law of Contract for the Civil Lawyer (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2007) 272. 
35
 Rice (t/a Garden Guardian) v Great Yarmouth Borough Council [2003] TCLR 1 (CA) criticised by Whittaker 
(n 17) 279-81. 
36
 See Whittaker (n 17). 
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That no duty of good faith or standard of reasonableness arises, whether at common 
law or in the context of contractual rights to terminate, has been made clear in several cases. 
For instance, in Lomas v JFB Firth Rixon Inc,
37
 Longmore LJ said obiter that ‘the right to 
terminate is no more an exercise of discretion, which is not to be exercised in an arbitrary or 
capricious (or perhaps unreasonable) manner, than the right to accept repudiatory conduct as 
a repudiation of contract… No one would suggest that there could be any impediment to 
accepting repudiatory conduct as termination of the contract based on the fact that the 
innocent party can elect between termination and leaving the contract on foot. The same 
applies to elective termination.’38 
It has however been suggested in a recent case that good faith could in certain 
circumstances constrain the promisee's election to affirm or terminate. In MSC 
Mediterranean Shipping SA v Cottonex Anstalt,
39
 the promisee, faced with a repudiatory 
breach, sought to affirm the contract and claim the contract price. Leggatt J thought that the 
decision to affirm and obtain payment had to be exercised in good faith. In his view, there 
should be no difference of approach between the exercise of a contractual discretion, which 
cannot be done arbitrarily and capriciously, and a choice whether to affirm or terminate a 
contract following a repudiatory breach. He said 'in each case, one party to the contract has a 
decision to make on a matter which affects the interests of the other party to the contract 
whose interests are not the same. The same reason exists in each case to imply some 
constraint on the decision-maker's freedom to act purely in its own self-interest'.
40
 He 
concluded that the tests were the same and the decision to affirm the contract had to be 
exercised in good faith. On the facts, the election to affirm the contract was wholly 
unreasonable. It had not been invoked for a proper purpose but rather to seek to generate a 
new revenue stream.  
 It remains to be seen whether Leggatt J's implication of a duty of good faith into the 
election between affirmation and termination will be applied more widely to all decisions 
between affirming or terminating. It was made in the particular context of the promisee 
wanting to affirm, as opposed to terminate the contract in order to perform and obtain the 
contract consideration.  
This type of situation has generated controversy in the past in White and Carter 
(Councils) Ltd v McGregor.
41
 In that case, Lord Reid suggested two possible limitations to 
the right to affirm the contract and claim the agreed price: first, performance by the injured 
promisee cannot require the cooperation of the other party; second the promisee must have a 
legitimate interest in performing the contract rather than claiming damages.
42
 It was this 
second limitation that was the focus of Leggatt J's comments, not whether all elections 
between affirming and terminating for breach should be made in good faith. It also appears 
only to have been this limitation that he thought should be reinterpreted in the light of what 
he characterised as the increasing recognition of good faith principles in contractual dealings. 
Another reason for doubting that Leggatt J's implication of a duty of good faith should 
have general application is that he made no mention of the authorities that draw a distinction 
between the exercise of a contractual discretion, which involves a choice from a range of 
                                                          
37
 [2012] EWCA 419. See also Sucden Financial Ltd v Fluxo-Can e Overseas Ltd [2009] EWHC 3555 (QB); TSG 
Building Services PLC v South Anglia Housing Limited [2013] EWHR 1151 (TCC). 
38
 Ibid [46]. See however Hooley (n 28) at 86-88 who argues that the promisee does have a discretion when 
faced with a repudiatory breach and that ‘there would be much to gain, in terms of reducing opportunistic 
behaviour or other cases of perceived unfairness, if English law were expressly to adopt a similar approach to 
the exercise of a right to termination for breach as it does to the exercise of contractual discretion’. 
39
 [2015] EWHC 283 (Comm). 
40
 ibid at [97]. 
41
 White and Carter (Councils) Ltd v McGregor [1962] AC 413 (HL Sc). 
42
 ibid at 443. 
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options, and binary decisions as to whether to exercise a contractual right.
43
 Some recent 
authorities have suggested that good faith obligations are only relevant in the former case, not 
the latter. On one view, an injured promisee who elects between terminating and affirming 
the contract is faced with a binary choice and therefore no duty of good faith arises.  
Another feature of Leggatt J's judgment is that he dealt with the consequences of 
repudiation in just 10 paragraphs, of which only two were focused on good faith and its 
potential application to the election to terminate. To introduce a general duty of good faith 
into this election would potentially impose a significant fetter on the promisee. Greater 
exploration and justification may be necessary in future cases for the duty to achieve wide 
acceptance.
44
   
 
(iii) Defences in Specific Situations 
 
While English law confers no general right on the defaulting promisor to cure his breach and 
good faith is irrelevant, except possibly to the injured promisee's election to affirm, an 
effective termination can be challenged in limited situations.  
 
(a) A Second Chance to Perform 
 
Relief against Forfeiture 
 
If the promisor is willing to perform, equity can intervene to grant relief against forfeiture in 
narrow circumstances. This arises where, upon the promisor's breach, the promisee invokes a 
forfeiture clause to forfeit the promisor's contractual rights. The relief generally takes the 
form of the promisor being allowed additional time to remedy the breach.
45
 As long as the 
promisor remedies the breach within the time fixed by the court, the contract is preserved and 
the promisee's right to terminate is lost.
46
 
A classic example is in the context of leases. In certain circumstances the landlord’s 
right to forfeit a lease for breach is subject to the tenant having an opportunity to cure the 
breach. Where, for instance, the lessee defaults on rent payments, the court may protect him 
against the landlord's right of re-entry or other power to terminate the lease. It does so by 
affording him more time to pay the outstanding rent and any order for possession of the 
property is postponed in the meantime. This jurisdiction is now on a statutory footing.
47
 
Similarly, in the context of mortgages, equity recognises a mortgagor's right to redeem the 
mortgage where payments due and not made are brought into court.
48
  
The restriction on freedom of contract inherent in the equitable jurisdiction is 
regarded as a lesser evil than unconscionable insistence on contractual terms.
49
 In the 
example of leases and mortgages, as long as the lessor and the mortgagee obtain what is 
contractually due to them, even if belatedly, it is thought fairer to keep the relationship alive. 
                                                          
43
 Leggatt J's analysis does not sit easily with the approach of Sir William Blackburne in the recent High Court 
decision of Myers v Kestrel Acquisitions Limited [2015] EWHC 916 (Ch); Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS 
Trust v Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd (t/a Medirest) [2013] EWCA Civ 200. 
44
 See Peel (n 10)'s view at [18-078] that 'the right to terminate is in the nature of an "absolute right" which is 
not subject to [an implied term that it must be exercised in good faith]'. 
45
 Chitty (n 5) [21-016]-[21-017]. 
46
 Chitty (n 5) [21-016]-[21-017]. 
47
 LPA 1925, s146. 
48
 Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding [1973] AC 691, 722ff. 
49
 J McGhee (ed), Snell's Equity (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) [13-001]. 
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The alternative of termination could have potentially significant negative ramifications for 
the promisor.
50
 
The equitable jurisdiction is however limited and exceptional,
51
 so as not to 
undermine contractual certainty.
52
 Relief is not available as of right but rather is discretionary 
and is only available where the forfeiture clause serves as security for the promisee to obtain 
payment or another advantage, the contract concerns the transfer or creation of proprietary or 
possessory rights and the forfeiture would result in the promisor losing those rights. The mere 
loss of a personal contractual right does not trigger the jurisdiction.
53
 Most contracts are 
therefore outside the scope of the doctrine.  
 
A Limited Right to Cure in the Sale of Goods Context 
 
The court also has jurisdiction to allow a second chance to a defaulting seller under a sale of 
goods contract, albeit in similarly limited circumstances.
54
 There are some authorities, 
concerned mainly with the tender of documents, which support the proposition that a seller 
who has made a non-conforming tender before the time for performance can retender.
55
 The 
scope of this right to cure is narrow, applying only to defective tenders that are not 
repudiatory. Where the non-conforming tender amounts to a repudiation, the injured 
promisee is entitled to terminate and not bound to accept the second tender.
56
 It therefore 
does not restrict the promisee's right to terminate as such.  
 
(b) Restrictions Arising by Operation of the Mitigation Principle  
 
Another ‘defence’ potentially available to the defaulting promisor as a means of impeding, 
even if not formally restricting the right to terminate arises through the doctrine of mitigation, 
which serves to limit the injured promisee's recovery of compensatory damages for losses 
that he could reasonably have avoided.
57
  
While in principle the promisee has a free choice between terminating and affirming 
the contract, the way that he exercises his election could draw criticism from the promisor for 
any unreasonable failure to mitigate loss.
58
 If the criticism is justified, the court could reduce 
                                                          
50
 N Andrews, M Clarke, A Tettenborn and G Virgo, Contractual Duties: Performance, Breach, Termination 
and Remedies (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) [25-065]. 
51
 Snell's Equity (n 49) [13-027]. 
52
 Union Eagle Ltd v Golden Achievement Ltd [1997] AC 514 (PC) 519 per Lord Hoffmann.  
53
 Scandiniavian Trading Tanker Co AB v Flota Petrolera Ecutoriana (The Scaptrade) [1983] 2 All ER 763. 
54
 R Ahdar, ‘Seller Cure in the Sale of Goods’ [1990] LMCLQ 364; A Apps, 'The Right to Cure for Defective 
Performance' [1994] LMCLQ 343; V Mak, 'The Seller's Right to Cure Defective Performance - A Reappraisal' 
[2007] LMCLQ 409. Note that consumer buyers have a right to have defective goods repaired or replaced unless 
this is impossible or disproportionate: s48A of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and s23 of the Consumer Rights Act 
2015 but this does not require the buyer to give the seller an opportunity to cure. 
55
 Borrowman Phillps v Free & Hollis (1878-79); EE & Brian Smith (1928) Ltd v Wheatsheaf Mills Ltd [1939] 2 
KB 302; Tetley v Shand (1871) 25 LT 658; The Kanchenjunga [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep 391 (HL). See M Bridge 
(ed), Benjamin’s Sale of Goods (n 30) [12-032]; M. Bridge, The Sale of Goods, 3rd edn (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2014) [10.129] ff. 
56
 However, where the first tender puts the promisor in repudiatory breach, the promisee can refuse any second 
tender from the promisor: Peel (n 10) [17-004]; Goode p374. 
57
 British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co Ltd v Underground Electric Railways Co of London Ltd 
[1912] AC 673. 
58
 Peel (n 10) [18-009]; S Whittaker, 'Contributory Fault and Mitigation, Rights and Reasonableness: 
Comparisons between English and French Law' in L Tichy (ed), Causation in Law (Prague, Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung, 2007) 147, 160-1; Andrews, Clarke, Tettenborn and Virgo (n50) [10-073] ff and [24-056] ff; A 
Kramer, The Law of Contract Damages (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2014) 399-404. For a possible restriction of 
the right to terminate resulting from the rule on penalties, see Bridge (n 3). 
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his entitlement to compensatory damages by a sum representing the amount of loss that he 
should have mitigated. The practical effect is to impose a fetter on his right to terminate or 
affirm.  
In many situations, the doctrine of mitigation leaves the promisee with little 
alternative than to terminate and seek substitute performance from a third party. If he prefers 
to persist with the promisor and affirms the contract, despite the promisor's default and in 
circumstances where to do so is unreasonable, this could amount to a failure to mitigate. It 
could cost him some or all of the damages that he might otherwise have recovered.
59
 
The doctrine can have the very opposite effect in other situations. The promisee could 
find that, in order to mitigate losses resulting from the breach, he should accept the promisor's 
offer of substitute performance, despite being entitled to terminate the contract. This does not 
mean that he is obliged to do so and he can freely terminate and end his relationship with the 
promisor, if he so wishes, but his damages award may be reduced commensurately. In this 
way, the mitigation doctrine incentivises the promisee to accept the promisor's offer to cure 
the harm caused by the breach and enter into a new contract with him. To this extent, both 
mitigation and the right to cure share similarities: they minimise the promisee's loss but also 
reduce the financial impact of breach on the promisor.
60
 
The leading case on the interrelation between the mitigation doctrine and the right to 
terminate is Payzu Ltd v Saunders.
61
 The seller had agreed to sell to the buyer a fabric called 
crêpe de chine. Delivery was to take place over a period of 9 months in return for payment 
within a month of each delivery. The buyer failed to make punctual payment after the first 
delivery. Erroneously believing that non-payment was due to the buyer’s lack of means, the 
seller refused to deliver more goods under the contract and instead offered to deliver the 
goods at the contract price only if the buyer agreed to pay in cash at the time of placing the 
orders. This offer was rejected by the buyer, which instead terminated the contract on the 
basis of the seller’s repudiation. The market price of the goods having risen in the interim, the 
buyer sued the seller for compensatory damages based on the difference between the market 
price and the contract price.  
The trial judge, with whom the Court of Appeal agreed, held that the buyer should 
have mitigated its loss by accepting the seller’s offer and revised payment terms. Scrutton LJ 
said ‘in commercial contracts it is generally reasonable to accept an offer from the party in 
default. However, it is always a question of fact.’ As a result, the measure of damages 
awarded was not the difference between the market price and the contract price but instead 
was confined to the loss that the buyer would have suffered, if it had accepted the offer.   
The rationale cited by the first instance judge was to avoid overburdening the 
defaulting promisor with liability. If the promisee can avoid part of his loss by accepting a 
reasonable offer made by the promisor, then he is expected to do so. Any remaining loss can 
be compensated in damages so as not to leave the promisee worse off. On the facts, the court 
found that the buyer was able to pay cash for the goods and seller's offer was bona fide. The 
buyer would only have suffered a small loss because of the less favourable payment 
conditions, for which damages would have been recoverable.
62
 It should therefore not have 
permitted itself 'to sustain a large measure of loss which as prudent and reasonable people 
they ought to have avoided’.63 
                                                          
59
 Habton Farms (an unlimited company) v Nimmo [2004] 1 QB 1 (CA) at [128] per Auld LJ. 
60
 M Bridge, 'Mitigation of Damages in Contract and the Meaning of Avoidable Loss' (1989) 105 LQR 398, 
412. 
61
 [1919] 2 KB 581. See also Houndsditch Warehouse Co Ltd v Waltex Ltd [1944] KB 579; Clegg v Andersson 
(t/a Nordic Marine) [2002] EWHC 943 (QB) at [61] per HHJ Richard Seymour QC. 
62
 See the explanation given by MacKenna J in Strutt Whinell [1975] 1 WLR 870 (CA) 875. 
63
 [1919] 2 KB 58, 586 (McCardie J). 
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In The Soholt,
64
 the Court of Appeal went further, finding that the promisee, the buyer 
of a ship, should actually have solicited such an offer from the defauting seller after 
exercising a contractual right to terminate the sale contract for late delivery. By this stage, the 
value of the ship had appreciated by $500,000, which the buyer claimed as compensatory 
damages. It was held that the buyer's failure to purchase the ship from the seller for the 
original price under a revised contract was a failure to mitigate, even though this had not been 
proposed by the seller. There was an onus on the buyer to take the initiative and offer to 
repurchase the ship at the original price after terminating the contract and the judge found 
that such an offer would have been accepted. It would then have been open to the buyer to 
seek to recover any losses resulting from the delay as damages. The implication appears to be 
that the promisee should consider not only any offer made by the defaulting promisor, but 
also making an offer to the promisor.
65
  
It is not solely in relation to sale of goods contracts that the promisee has been found 
to have acted unreasonably in rejecting the promisor's offer to contract on new terms. An 
employee who has been dismissed can also in certain circumstances be expected to accept an 
offer of re-employment. In Brace v Calder,
66
 for instance, the manager of a business was 
dismissed automatically under his employment contract as a result of a change in the 
ownership of the business. The Court of Appeal held that he should have accepted an offer of 
re-engagement by the new business owners on the same terms as previously applied. His 
refusal to do so was unreasonable and the resulting loss was of his own making. Similarly, in 
building contracts, the refusal by an employer to allow a contractor to undertake remedial 
works may amount to a failure to mitigate. In Woodlands Oak Ltd v Conwell,
67
 for example, 
the Court of Appeal upheld the first instance judge's decision that the claimant homeowners 
should have allowed their builders an opportunity to rectify defects that were mere snagging 
items.  
It is important however not to overstate the effect of the mitigation doctrine. Whether 
the promisee should seek substitute performance from the promisor is a question of fact.
68
 
The standard of reasonableness that must be attained for the duty to mitigate to be discharged 
is relatively low. The courts are sensitive to the circumstances of the promisee, as epitomised 
by Tomlinson J’s observation in Britvic Soft Drinks Ltd v Messer UK Ltd69 that there should 
be a ‘tender approach to those who have been placed in a predicament by a breach of 
contract’.70 This was echoed by HHJ Coulson QC, sitting as a Judge of the High Court, in 
Iggleden v Fairview New Home (Shooters Hill) Ltd,
71
 when considering whether the 
purchasers of a house that had defects failed to mitigate their loss by not allowing the builders 
to remedy the defects. He said that ‘it would take a relatively extreme set of facts to persuade 
me that it was appropriate to deny a homeowner financial compensation for admitted defects, 
and leave him with no option but to employ the self-same contractor to carry out the 
necessary rectification works’.72  
There are many cases in which the courts have found that the promisee has acted 
reasonably and not failed to mitigate loss by refusing the promisor’s offer. By way of 
example, it has been held to be unreasonable for the promisor to require the promisee to 
                                                          
64
 Sotiros Shipping Inc v Samiet Soholt (The Soholt) [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 605 (CA). 
65
 Both Payzu and The Soholt were forcefully criticised by Bridge (n 60) at p 420 for rendering the ‘buyer’s 
right of contractual discharge for late delivery utterly illusory’. 
66
 [1895] 2 QB 253 (CA). See also Wilding v BT plc [2002] IRLR 524 (CA). 
67
 [2011] EWCA Civ 254. 
68
 Payzu Ltd v Saunders [1919] 2 KB 581, 589 (Scrutton LJ). 
69
 [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 20 (QB). 
70
 ibid at 46. 
71
 [2007] EWHC 1573 (TCC). 
72
 ibid at [77]. 
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forfeit his right to compensatory damages.
73
 It has also been said to be unreasonable to 
require the promisee to accept an offer where the terms proposed are inferior to those 
originally agreed,
74
 or where the relationship between the parties has been badly damaged, 
for instance where confidence has been lost
75
 or the promisor has ‘grossly injured’ the 
promisee. This is especially true in personal service contracts.
76
 Some judges have also 
expressed concern that the mitigation doctrine undermines the promisee’s right of termination 
by covert means and should not be allowed to curtail his choice between alternative 
remedies.
77
  
 
(c)  Defences to Termination by Agreement 
 
A more direct way of limiting or even excluding a common law right to terminate is by the 
agreement of the parties. It has already been shown that termination clauses prescribing when 
the right to terminate arises feature widely in commercial contracts. Many such provisions 
extend the scope for terminating the contract beyond the common law right to accept a 
repudiatory breach.  
 There is nothing however to prevent the parties from agreeing to narrow
78
 or even 
exclude altogether
79
 the common law right. Alternatively, they might stipulate that the 
promisee is permitted to terminate only after the promisor has had an opportunity to remedy 
the breach within a defined period of time. He would be able to make good his default under 
the terms of the contract, which in practical effect is tantamount to a contractual right to cure.
 
 
 Clauses of this nature are by no means unusual in commercial contracts. Guidance on 
their drafting and usage can be found in standard texts on boilerplate commercial clauses. 
Such provisions owe their validity to the widely accepted principle of freedom of contract. 
By enabling the parties to tailor the remedy to their particular needs and wishes, they are an 
efficient means of giving the defaulting promisor a second chance and preserving his interest 
in performing. 
 
C Concluding Remarks on Defence to Termination in English Law 
 
The common law right to terminate arises only in narrow circumstances. The defaulting 
promisor's interests are protected mainly in the rules as to when the right arises and his 
primary defence to a purported termination will often be that no right has arisen. However, 
when the right does arise, the defences available to the promisor are correspondingly narrow. 
The right is relatively unfettered and there are few grounds on which he might hope to resist 
termination. This contrasts with French law, in which the grounds for opposing termination 
are wider. 
 
III. Resisting Termination in French Law 
                                                          
73
 Houndsditch Warehouse Co Ltd v Waltex Ltd [1944] KB 579; Shindler v Northern Raincoat Co Ltd [1960] 1 
WLR 1038; Strutt v Whitnell [1975] 1 WLR 870. 
74
 In an employment context, see Jackson v Hayes Candy & Co Ltd [1938] 4 All ER 587; Yetton v Eastwoods 
Froy Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 104; in the context of sale of good, see Heaven & Kesterton Ltd v Et Francois Albiac & 
Co [1956] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 316 at 321. 
75
 Jackson v Hayes Candy & Co Ltd [1938] 4 All ER 353 (Du Parcq LJ). 
76
 Payzu at 588 (Bankes LJ) and 589 (Scrutton LJ). 
77
 eg Heaven & Kesterton Ltd v Etablissements Francois Albiac & Co [1956] 2 Lloyd's Rep 316, 321 (Devlin J). 
78
 Hongkong Fir Shipping Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd (The 'Hongkong Fir') [1962] 2 QB 26 (CA) 69 
(Lord Diplock). On the relationship between a contractual right to terminate and the right to terminate at 
common law, see Stocznia Gdynia SA v Gearbulk Holdings Ltd [2009] BLR 196 (CA). 
79
 Peel (n 10) [18-074]. 
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Before analysing the approach of French law to defences to termination, it is important to 
point out that French contract law is in the process of being substantially reformed. By way 
of context, the section of the Civil Code on contract law has remained largely unchanged 
since its creation in 1804. It does not reflect the actual state of the law in this area, which has 
evolved significantly over the last two centuries.  
At the time of finalising this chapter (March 2016), new articles of the Civil Code on 
contract law had just been published.
80
 They are due to come into force in October 2016. 
Both the approach of French law before the reforms and the changes that they will bring are 
considered here. It will be shown that, while the reforms introduce changes to the process of 
terminating a contract, they are unlikely to have a significant impact on the wide defences 
that the promisor can draw upon to resist termination. 
The wider availability in France of defences to termination for breach can be 
attributed partly to the way that termination has traditionally operated, which is very different 
from England. A significant role in deciding the fate of the contract is (at least until the 
incoming reforms) reserved to the French court. Its role is to decide whether the promisee 
should be entitled to terminate.  
 
A The Process of Termination  
 
As in England, termination is available in France for 'serious' breaches of contract.
81
 Factors 
that are relevant to whether a breach justifies termination include the consequences of the 
breach, whether the contract would still serve its intended purpose, the nature of the contract, 
whether the obligation that has been breached is essential, whether the failure to perform is 
total or partial, and the behaviour of the contracting parties.
82
 
Unlike in England, termination has historically not been a self-help remedy. This will 
change when the reforms are implemented: the promisor will have a choice between judicial 
and self-help termination. Until then, the longstanding rule is that, subject to certain 
exceptions,
83
 the injured promisee wishing to terminate for breach must apply to the court.
84
 
Only by an order of the court can the contract be discharged. He cannot of his own accord 
treat the breach as discharging him from his contractual obligations.
85
 As such, he cannot be 
said to have a 'right' of termination, at least in the sense that the term is used in England. 
First instance judges in France have considerable room for manoeuvre when deciding 
whether a contract should be terminated for breach. Generally they endeavour to protect the 
contractual relationship and the interests of the promisor.
86
 An initial step in this process is to 
                                                          
80
 Ordonnance no 2016-131 of 10 February 2016 portant réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de 
la preuve des obligations: < https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/ordonnance/2016/2/10/JUSC1522466R/jo/texte> 
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 eg Civ (1) 12 Mar 1956, D 1956, 302; Civ (1) 15 July  1999, Bull civ I no 245. Article 1184 of the Civil Code 
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 See Rowan (n 81) at 81. 
83
 On termination in French law, see Rowan (n 81) 80-94.  
84
 Article 1184, para 3 of the Civil Code. 
85
 Whittaker (n 19) 1090. 
86
 F Terré, P Simler and Y Lequette, Droit civil, Les obligations (11
th
 edn, Dalloz Paris 2013) [642]; J Rochfeld, 
‘Résolution et exception d'inexécution' in P Rémy-Corlay and D Fenouillet (eds), Les concepts contractuels 
français à l'heure des principes du droit européen des contrats (Paris, Dalloz, 2003) 216. 
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ascertain whether he really is unable or unwilling to perform or the contract can be saved.
87
 
This reflects a belief that he should not be deprived of the benefit of the contract too quickly 
or arbitrarily;
88
 termination is the last possible resort.
89
 Whatever the severity of the breach, 
the court can still refuse termination and order another remedy
90
 or an intermediate measure 
such as a grace period in which the promisor may attempt anew to perform. Judicial 
discretion in relation to termination will remain after the reform where the promisee elects 
judicial termination over self-help termination or where the issue comes before the court 
because the promisor disputes the attempted termination, as explained below.
91
 
 
B Defences to Termination in French Law 
 
This judicial discretion over termination and the prevailing willingness to protect the 
contractual relationship and the promisor's interests together give rise to several grounds on 
which termination can be resisted. 
 
(i) Offer from the Defaulting Promisor to Perform and Grace Period 
 
If a promisor faced with termination proceedings offers to perform or requests an extension 
of time, this may result in the promisee being deprived of the remedy. 
 
(a) Offer from the Defaulting Promisor to Perform 
 
There is no general 'right to cure' breach in the French Civil Code but several provisions do 
nonetheless confer such a right on the promisor in the context of specific contracts. As an 
example, in contracts for the construction and sale of buildings, article 1646-1 of the code 
expressly provides that the promisor has a right to cure any defects in the building works. If 
the defects are remedied, the promisee cannot terminate the contract.   
In other situations, and in contrast with English law, even if a breach is sufficiently 
serious to justify termination, it is well established and uncontroversial that the court may 
refuse the remedy where the promisor is still willing to perform his side of the bargain.
92
 If he 
makes an offer to perform that is considered by the court to be satisfactory from the 
perspective of the promisee, the contract remains on foot.
93
 The promisor can therefore 
generally resist termination by making a reasonable offer to perform. It is open to him to 
                                                          
87
 R Cassin, ‘Réflexions sur la résolution judiciaire des contrats pour inexécution’ RTD civ 1945.12, [2]. 
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30 Nov 1949, JCP 1952.II.6802, note Rech, RTD civ 1956.183, noted by H et L Mazeaud. 
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make such an offer either before termination has been ordered or even when an appeal 
against the remedy is pending.
94
  
The willingness of courts in France to uphold the contract in this way is illustrated by 
a case arising out of the sale of a plot of land.
95
 The parties had agreed that the price would be 
paid in 3 instalments. Only the first 2 instalments were paid. After several years, the seller 
applied to the court for an order terminating the contract. The buyer sought to resist 
termination by offering to pay the third instalment. The Montpellier Court of Appeal, with 
which the Cour de Cassation agreed, refused to order termination: the offer to cure was held 
to be satisfactory in the circumstances. 
 
(b) Grace Periods (Délai de Grâce)  
 
The Civil Code also gives the court jurisdiction to grant the promisor a period of grace (délai 
de grâce),
96
 provided that performance remains possible and would still serve its intended 
purpose.
 
Although the agreed timetable can no longer be met and even if the breach is 
sufficiently serious to justify termination, belated performance is acceptable
97
 and perceived 
as being better than none at all.
98
 
First instance courts have a very wide discretion as to whether to order a grace period, 
provided that the promisor acts in good faith.
99
 The Cour de cassation rarely interferes.
100
 
There is no limit on the possible duration of the grace period,
101
 except that it is not 
renewable. It is therefore open to the court to grant the promisor whatever time is necessary 
for him to perform and 'save the contract'.
102
 The court must also take account of the interests 
of the promisee and any loss that he would suffer from more time being granted, thereby 
striking a balance between the interests of both parties. 
 
(ii) The Relevance of Good Faith 
 
It has been held in France that termination 'can only be granted if the injured promisee acts in 
good faith'
103
 and should be rejected 'if his behaviour is tainted with bad faith'
104
 or his 
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request for termination 'can be characterised as disloyal speculation'.
105
 The promisor can 
therefore pray in aid the principle of good faith to challenge the promisee's attempt to 
terminate. This enables the court to take into consideration the behaviour and motives of the 
promisee, in particular any evidence of good or bad faith,
106
 in deciding whether to order 
termination. As an example from the cases, a promisee was found to have acted in bad faith 
by seeking to terminate where he had not complained about the breach for 19 years.
107
  
 Good faith is also relevant where the contract contains a termination clause. In 
principle, where the promisee invokes a contractual right to terminate, the court can do no 
more than ascertain whether the conditions for the exercise of the right have been met. 
However, in practice, termination clauses have been read restrictively and as being subject to 
a requirement that they be exercised in good faith. When invoked in bad faith, a termination 
clause will not be enforced.
108
  
The potential impact of good faith in the context of termination clauses is neatly 
illustrated by a case from 1994.
109
 The Limoges Court of Appeal refused to enforce a 
termination clause on the ground, amongst others, that the injured promisee had sought to 
rely on the promisor's breaches and invoke the clause as a pretext in order to be able to enter 
into more profitable transactions with third parties. This decision was upheld by the Cour de 
cassation.  
   
(iii) The Reform of the Civil Code 
 
A notable change relating to termination brought about by the reforms that shifts French law 
towards the position in England is that the promisee will no longer be obliged to seek a court 
order to terminate a contract. Instead he will be able to elect between judicial and self-help 
termination.
110
 Judicial termination will closely resemble the current termination regime. 
Where the promisee chooses self-help termination, the contract will be discharged unless the 
promisor brings proceedings to challenge his right to do so.
111
  
The promisor will not however be deprived of the currently available defences. If he 
challenges a purported self-help termination following the implementation of the reforms, the 
court will still be able to allow a grace period.
112
 In deciding whether or not to do so, the 
court is likely to apply the same criteria as at present, with particular focus on whether the 
promisor has made a satisfactory offer to perform. If the court finds that termination is not 
justified and performance remains possible, it is likely that performance will be ordered.
113
 
Much of the considerable protection for the promisor willing to perform therefore remains. 
It will be interesting to observe the take-up of the self-help variant of termination as 
French legal practice acclimatises to the reforms.
114
 On the face of things, it is a streamline 
option that should appeal to contracting parties, enabling them to end failed and failing 
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contracts and move on swiftly. The knock-on effect may be fewer termination disputes 
coming before the French courts. There is however also a possibility that legal practitioners 
and disputants will proceed cautiously at least initially and some may yet prefer the certainty 
and definitiveness of judicial termination. 
  
C Concluding Remarks on Termination in French law 
 
French courts have wide discretion in relation to termination. It is not confined to protecting 
the promisee; account can also be taken of the defaulting promisor's circumstances and 
interests and he is allowed generous opportunity to avoid termination and perform belatedly. 
It is not unusual for a promisor to be granted a second chance.  
 
IV. Defences to Termination: Comparative Remarks 
 
The preceding survey of the defences to termination in England and France has revealed 
differences in approach and broader grounds for resisting termination in France than England. 
It will be argued in the remaining part of this chapter that these differences are largely 
attributable to divergent policy choices in the two jurisdictions.   
 
A Divergent Policy Choices 
 
The broad availability in France of defences to termination owes much to a desire to uphold 
contractual relations and protect performance.
115
 It is widely believed amongst French 
lawyers that performance is the essence of a contract. Where a breach has been committed, 
the parties are encouraged to persist in their relationship and find a solution. The contractual 
relationship should be saved, if possible.
116
 It is preferable to try to rescue rather than to 
terminate it. Termination should be the very last resort.  
This reflects the importance that French law ascribes to contractual obligations. The 
concept of the contract is much more subjective than in England, being seen as a consensual 
bond that has intrinsic value.
117
 Only performance by the original contracting party is 
regarded as being truly satisfactory. In the words of the renowned French contract lawyer, 
Mestre: 'the raison d'être [of the contract] is to unite individuals…It is to be performed 
loyally … and is … above all a human affair … The contract cannot be reduced, in an 
economic approach, to a transfer of values or a modification of estates'.
118
 
The promotion of performance that is at the heart of the French law on termination is 
linked to a belief that it is not simply the promisee that has an interest in the performance of 
the contract. The promisor also has an 'interest in performing'
119
 worthy of protection. This 
interest continues to exist where he has committed a breach and regardless even of its 
seriousness. Restricting the promisee's right to terminate ensures that the interest is upheld 
and cannot be defeated lightly.
120
 Another eminent French contract lawyer, Genicon, goes as 
far as to say that 'the position of the promisor is of prime importance'.
121
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The commitment to the survival of the contractual relationship in France is not 
confined to the context of defences to termination. It pervades the whole remedial framework 
of French law.
122
 For instance, specific remedies such as specific performance and injunctive 
relief are central and given primary importance. They are available as of right and subject to 
very few restrictions.
123
 There is in this respect internal coherence and consistency in the 
French remedial system: the restrictions on termination interconnect with, and complement, 
the primacy and wide availability of specific performance.
124
 As between terminating the 
contract and compelling its performance, French law very clearly favours the latter. 
There is no similar willingness to uphold a failed contract in England, where ensuring 
that the promisor performs the primary obligations that he has undertaken is markedly less 
important.
125
 It is generally considered that contracting parties should not have to remain tied 
together when their relationship has been unsuccessful. In many situations the promisee can 
put an end to the failed contract quickly so as to obtain substitute performance and reinvest 
his resources in another way. Upholding the contractual relationship is subordinate to the 
overall economic outcome
126
 and only encouraged if this serves to minimise loss.  
The approach adopted in England has been attributed to the commercial nature of the 
disputes that typically come before English courts. Certainty and speed serve the interests of 
commercial parties.
127
 The emphasis is on providing an expeditious and convenient way for 
the promisee to obtain the bargained-for benefit, which often means exiting the contract and 
using his resources elsewhere. Any additional cost that he incurs in doing so will often be 
recoverable as damages.  
The liberality of this approach has been noted by commentators. As McKendrick has 
said: 
 
English law ... places considerable emphasis on the importance of termination 
as a remedy in the event of breach. ... At the risk of some over-statement it can 
be said that the philosophy of English law is that when one encounters a 
problem which has been caused by a breach of contract committed by the 
other party to the contract, the law should make it easy for the innocent party 
to walk away from the transaction to enter into a fresh transaction 
elsewhere.
128
  
 
The comparatively narrow circumstances in English law in which the promisee is 
required or incentivised to give the promisor another chance suggests that there is no 
particular desire to uphold contractual relationships. A more diverse set of policy 
considerations is in play and their collective aim appears to be to balance the competing 
interests of the parties. Beyond this, there does not seem to be any common thread running 
through the cases in which the promisor has been given a second chance to perform. Relief 
against forfeiture seeks to prevent unconscionable insistence on a contractual right of 
forfeiture. The mitigation principle, on the other hand, aims to minimise economic waste,
129
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encourage self-reliance in the promisee
130
 and deter him from burdening the defaulting 
promisor with all conceivable losses.
131
  
Unlike in France, there is also no or little emphasis on and indeed barely any mention 
of the promisor having an 'interest in performing'.
132
 The focus in the case law and literature 
has predominantly been on the protection of the 'performance interest' or 'expectations 
interest' of the promisee and these terms are commonly used to describe his interest in 
obtaining the promised performance under the contract.
133
 Comparatively little work has been 
done on the corresponding interest of the promisor.
134
 As Treitel summarised, 'Anglo-
American courts are, in the matter of termination, less concerned with the protection of the 
debtor than either German or French law. Their emphasis tends … to be on speedy and 
convenient remedies for the creditor'.
135
 
This approach to termination also fits coherently and consistently in the wider 
framework of contractual remedies under English law. The limited restrictions on the right to 
terminate dovetail with the limited availability of specific performance. There is an inverse 
and complementary relationship between the two mutually exclusive remedies. As between 
terminating the contract and compelling its performance, English law inclines towards the 
former, preferring to compensate any loss suffered with an award of damages.
136
 
 
B Approaches taken by International Instruments 
 
This is not to say however that the differing approaches in England and France are 
necessarily irreconcilable. Some international instruments have adopted the essential 
elements of each system. The key tenets of the English approach of encouraging loss 
mitigation and promoting contractual certainty operate in tandem with those from French 
law, namely preserving the contractual relationship and protecting the interests of the 
contracting parties.  
For instance, the UNIDROIT Principles do not allow the court to grant a grace period. 
It is feared that this would only delay the injured promisee exercising the right to 
terminate.
137
 The promisor does however have a right to cure defective performance where 
the cure is prompt and the injured promisee has no legitimate reason to refuse.
138
 This is 
available for all kinds of breach, except where time is of the essence.
139
 Cure can consist of 
repair or replacement and be effected before or after the due date of performance. It is not 
precluded by a notice of termination having been given, meaning that ‘a contract that has 
been formally terminated’ can be revived.140 Only where the time allowed for cure has 
expired can the injured promisee terminate the contract if cure is unsuccessful. The rationale 
                                                          
130
 Bridge (n 60). 
131
 A Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract, 3
rd
 ed (Oxford, OUP, 2004). 
132
 Whittaker (n 58). 
133
 Rowan (n 81) 2. 
134
 With the exception of Whittaker (n 58) and Rowan (n 81) 99-102. 
135
 Treitel (n 18) [259]. 
136
 Rowan (n 81) pp 97-8. 
137
 H Schelhaas, Commentary on article 7.1 of the Unidroit Principles at p 828 in S Vogenauer (ed), 
Commentary on the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC), 2
nd
 ed (Oxford, OUP, 
2015). 
138
 See article 7.1.4 of the UNIDROIT Principles. Schelhaas (n 137) pp 845-850.  
139
 Schelhaas (n 137) pp 846-7.   
140
 Off Comment 10 to article 7.1.4, p230; Schelhaas (n 137) p 849 who criticises this as hardly conducive to 
legal certainty and open to criticism: the injured promisee is under the impression that he has lawfully 
terminated the contract yet the defaulting promisor may subsequently exercise his right to cure with the effect 
that the contract turns out not to be terminated after all. 
       19 
for allowing cure is to preserve the contract, minimise economic waste and achieve a solution 
that is in the interests of both parties.
141
  
There is similarly no grace period under the UN Convention on the International Sale 
of Goods (CISG).
142
 This is attributable to concern that the parties could be exposed to 
judicial discretion that is too broad and creates too much uncertainty.
143
 The defaulting seller 
does however have a right to cure where he fails to perform by the due date, which 
principally arises where goods delivered are not in conformity with the contract.
144
 Unlike 
under the UNIDROIT Principles, the promisee's right to terminate seems to take priority over 
the promisor's right to cure.
145
  
The apparent priority of the right to terminate is controversial and has been criticised 
for depriving the promisor's right to cure of any substance.
146
 In the legal literature, the 
prevailing view is that, even where the defect in the non-conforming goods is serious, the 
promisee's right to terminate should not prevent the promisor from curing the breach where 
this can be done without undue delay or unreasonable inconvenience to the promisee.
147
 The 
right to terminate should only prevail where this serves to protect special interests of the 
buyer, for instance where time is of the essence or there has been a breach of trust between 
the parties.
148
  
Although not without problems themselves,
149
 the defences to termination found in 
the international instruments demonstrate that there is middle ground between the rules in 
England and France. In giving less ammunition to the defaulting promisor than in France but 
more than in England, the instruments have achieved a compromise and a balance between 
the termination regimes of the two jurisdictions. 
 
V Conclusion 
 
It is fair to say that ‘English law seems reluctant to give second chances to [defaulting 
parties] who fail to get it right the first time round’.150 The interests of the defaulting 
promisor are protected mainly in the rules as to when the right to terminate arises. Once the 
right has arisen, it is relatively unrestricted and there are few defences that he can invoke to 
resist termination. This contrasts with French law, which has wider grounds for opposing 
termination, thereby giving greater protection to the defaulting promisor and more generally 
the contract. Underpinning this is a wider policy of protecting contractual performance. 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to consider whether English law should in the 
future evolve in this direction to recognise more numerous defences to termination in English 
law or indeed the form that any such defences might take. What the chapter has shown 
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however is that there are currently few defences that enable termination to be resisted. There 
is therefore scope for developing new defences, if this were considered desirable.  
A possible progression in the near future is a more significant role for good faith, 
potentially as an aspect of increasing prominence of good faith principles in English law. 
There have also been calls in the literature for the recognition of a general right to cure in the 
context of sale of goods contracts, which it is argued would better protect the interests of the 
parties, increase loss mitigation, and help avoid the possibility of the injured promisee 
escaping the contract for an ulterior motive such as to take advantage of market 
fluctuations.
151
 However, the introduction of such a defence in England presently seems 
unlikely. It was firmly rejected by the Law Commission in the context of consumer and non-
consumer sales.
152
 In relation to consumer sales, the Law Commission's view was that it 
would give too much power to sellers against buyers and be too difficult to implement.
153
 For 
commercial contracts, it described a right to cure as ‘positively inappropriate’: it would be 
impractical in many situations and unsuited to large commercial transactions.
154
 The Law 
Commission recommended instead that contracting parties who wish to have a right to cure 
following breach should make appropriate provision in their contract.
155
 While this approach 
disappointed many,
156
 it has the merit of being simple and easy to adopt: it is founded on the 
key principle of freedom of contract, requires no drastic change in the law and policy, and 
gives the parties responsibility for the level of protection that they perceive as being 
adequate.  
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